1. Introduction {#sec0005}
===============

As a specific component of corporate social responsibility, corporate charitable giving (*CCG*) is the act of corporations donating a portion of their profits or resources to social and charitable causes, including support for education, culture, the arts, minorities, health care, the environment and other public benefits ([@bib0140], [@bib0265]). Why do corporations do this? According to value enhancement theory, *CCG* creates value for shareholders ([@bib0065], [@bib0130], [@bib0220]). [@bib0065] argued that *CCG* could be viewed as a form of investment to maximize shareholder value by enhancing employee morale, customer loyalty, and preferential treatment by regulators or policymakers. Researchers in finance, management and social science have attempted to identify the effects of *CCG* on corporate performance ([@bib0055], [@bib0200], [@bib0265]). However, there is no consensus on the effects of *CCG* on corporate performance ([@bib0055], [@bib0265]).

Empirical studies have found mixed evidence on whether *CCG* can enhance or deteriorate corporate performance. [@bib0265] concluded that *CCG* facilitates stakeholder cooperation and helps secure access to critical resources controlled by those stakeholders, suggesting that *CCG* should be positively associated with corporate financial performance. In addition, according to the value enhancement theory, *CCG* can persuade target stakeholders that a firm is socially responsible. [@bib0065] and [@bib0220] indicated that a positive company image could create the competitive advantages of brand differentiation, stakeholder loyalty and insurance-like protection. These competitive advantages thereby improve operational efficiency, reduce cost and generate profit for shareholders. Consequently, *CCG* should have a positive impact on corporate performance.

In contrast, *CCG* could have a negative influence on corporate performance. Based on agency cost theory, *CCG* may be considered as an additional agency cost generated by the conflict between shareholders and managerial insiders (managers and board directors) over charitable donation ([@bib0065]). When managerial insiders pursue their own interest through discretionary giving, they tend to give more to charity but at the expense of shareholders' interest ([@bib0035], [@bib0155], [@bib0265]). Thus when the managerial insiders have an incentive to use *CCG* to enhance their own interests, *CCG* would not benefit the corporation and its shareholders. Instead, it may divert valuable corporate resources and undermine corporate performance.

Nonetheless, some research studies revealed that *CCG* has a negligible effect on corporate performance. [@bib0150] investigated the relationship between *CCG* and corporate performance. They found no support for the relationship between *CCG* and corporate profitability measures (return on asset and return on equity). [@bib0045] also showed that *CCG* could not significantly affect corporate financial performance measured by return on asset. Similarly, [@bib0245] showed that *CCG* could not have a strong effect on corporate stock return.

[@bib0265] showed a curvilinear relation between *CCG* and corporate financial performance. Specifically, they detected an inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and return on asset, and between *CCG* and Tobin\'s Q. In other words, an increased *CCG* can enhance return on asset and Tobin\'s Q. However, as the level of *CCG* reached a certain point, an increase in *CCG* could have a negative influence on return on asset and on Tobin\'s Q.

This study examines whether *CCG* affects the corporate performance of publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan. Several examinations of the effects of *CCG* on firm performance, on the one hand, have been conducted for developed countries, such as the UK (for example, [@bib0055]) and USA ([@bib0245], [@bib0265], [@bib0200]). No research studies have investigated whether corporate giving affects the corporate performance in an emerging country. Since economic, ethic, social, legal, political and culture factors differ between developed and emerging countries, corporate structure (such as firm characteristics, agency conflicts and business environment) in emerging countries would be different from those in developed countries ([@bib0270], [@bib0275]). As [@bib0065], [@bib0220] and [@bib0265] noted, agency cost, value-enhancing and other firm-related factors are critical determinants of corporate giving. Given the potential differences in corporate structure across countries that may lead to the diverse giving determinants from country to country, corporate giving and its relative importance would vary across countries ([@bib0240]). Accordingly, it would be interesting and worthwhile to see if corporate giving also affects corporate financial performance in an emerging country.

On the other hand, the impact of *CCG* on corporate performance is also likely to differ among industries given that corporate structure and financial performance can vary widely across industry sectors ([@bib0030]). While it may be true, no research has analyzed the issue using data from the industry sectors. This study is the first empirical research paper to extend the investigation of the effects of *CCG* on corporate performance to the hospitality industry.

As [@bib0095] noted, the prosperity of the hospitality industry in Taiwan due to the strong growth of both domestic and international tourism markets ([@bib0085], [@bib0090]) has attracted academic researchers' attention and has generated several financial studies of the Taiwanese hospitality industry. For example, [@bib0105] tested the impact of a set of macroeconomic variables on hotel stock returns in Taiwan. [@bib0100] examined the effect of the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) on Taiwanese hotel stock prices. [@bib0080] studied whether monetary policy changes could affect Taiwanese hotel stock returns. [@bib0095] investigated the impact of insider managerial ownership on financial performance of publicly traded tourist hotels in Taiwan. Although previous hospitality studies have analyzed various financial issues and made different contributions to the research on the hospitality industry in Taiwan, this study can further enrich the hospitality financial literature by examining the impact of *CCG* on the Taiwanese hospitality firms' performance.

Moreover, corporate giving in the Taiwanese hospitality industry has expanded rapidly since the 1990s. Specifically, the total value of annual corporate giving of the Taiwanese hospitality industry was approximately NT\$ (New Taiwan dollar) 2.70 million in 1996. The total value increased to 6.62 million in 2009, 11.42 million in 2010 and 11.62 million in 2011, an approximately 330.4% growth rate over that 16-year period. According to the Market Observation Post System (<http://newmopsov.twse.com.tw/>), the total value of *CCG* made by Taiwanese publicly traded companies was about NT\$ 2.80 billion in 2011. This figure represents about 0.28% of all annual pre-taxable profits of all publicly traded companies in Taiwan. The total value of *CCG* from hospitality companies amounted to approximately NT\$ 11.62 million in 2011. The hospitality industry, among 27 industry sectors listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2011, was ranked second in terms of the ratio of the total value of *CCG* to sales revenue, only behind the biotechnology industry (see [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"} ).Fig. 1The mean ratio of corporate giving to sales revenue (1996--2011).

Why were Taiwan\'s publicly traded companies in the hospitality industry willing to give to charity? Do publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan expect *CCG* to have a beneficial effect on their corporate performance by conveying a positive company image as the value enhancement theory suggests? Do hospitality companies realize that *CCG* could have an adverse impact on corporate performance according to agency cost theory, or that *CCG* may not even affect corporate performance at all? Accordingly, the major contribution of this study is to analyze whether *CCG* affects the corporate performance of publicly traded hospitality companies, and if so, whether the relation between *CCG* and corporate performance is curvilinear and whether the impact is positive, negative or negligible.

Given that the mixed measures of corporate performance used in previous studies ([@bib0055], [@bib0200], [@bib0265]), the study uses a broader set of performance measures to provide a comprehensive insight on the effects of *CCG* on the corporate performance measures of publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan. The indicators of corporate performance under consideration are profitability measures (return on assets and return on equity), stock performance and Tobin\'s Q. Return on assets (*ROA*) and return on equity (*ROE*) are two of the most popular profitability measures used in the business and finance literature. Stock price, reflecting the earnings prospects of a company, can be used to compute shareholders' return and evaluate financial performance of publicly traded hospitality companies. Tobin\'s Q is commonly used to measure the intangible asset values of companies.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section [2](#sec0010){ref-type="sec"} reviews the literature. Section [3](#sec0015){ref-type="sec"} describes data and variables. Section [4](#sec0035){ref-type="sec"} presents the methodology of panel regression tests. Section [5](#sec0050){ref-type="sec"} reports panel regression test results. Section [6](#sec0055){ref-type="sec"} concludes the study with a discussion of the major findings.

2. Literature review {#sec0010}
====================

Value enhancement theory and agency cost theory have been most frequently used to explain the behavior of *CCG* ([@bib0065], [@bib0130], [@bib0220]). Value enhancement theory suggests that *CCG* acts as a specific business expense that can benefit firm performance ([@bib0220]). Alternatively, agency cost theory advocates that *CCG* may be considered as an additional agency cost generated by the conflict between shareholders and the managerial insiders concerning charitable donation ([@bib0065]). The interaction of benefit and cost generated by *CCG* consequently determines the effects of *CCG* on corporate performance ([@bib0035], [@bib0055], [@bib0140], [@bib0200], [@bib0245], [@bib0265]). The financial consequence of *CCG* could be positive, negative or even neutral.

In the hope of enhancing corporate performance, companies can use *CCG* to convey a socially responsible image to key stakeholders, including employees, consumers, investors, stockholders, publics and societal institutions ([@bib0055], [@bib0265]). A positive public image brings a firm several advantages. [@bib0055] and [@bib0200] argued that a socially responsible image can help companies to facilitate cooperation with stakeholders. [@bib0065] and [@bib0140] stated that a socially responsible image provides firm\'s assets with a sort of insurance against negative event.

[@bib0265] noted that as *CCG* enhances a firm\'s public image, the firm\'s key stakeholders, including its current and prospective employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders and the community, are likely to feel more positively about being associated with such a firm and hence more willing to cooperate with it by providing resources ([@bib0020], [@bib0120]). For instance, [@bib0120] found that employees show greater commitment to a firm that has a reputation for supplying human capital. [@bib0020], [@bib0145] and [@bib0255] demonstrated that job seekers see firms with a positive public image as desirable employers.

According to [@bib0220], many of the benefits of *CCG* are likely to accrue to labor rather than capital and firms may use *CCG* as a management strategy to increase productivity and to reduce labor cost. Similarly, firms may be able to offset some of the pecuniary demands of workers through *CCG* by offering a greater number of nonpecuniary benefits, and facilitate staff recruitment and retention and improve labor productivity ([@bib0055]). Thus, firms with higher *CCG* may increase their operating efficiency and decrease operating cost by raising employee morale and productivity, thereby generating higher revenues and profits.

[@bib0130] and [@bib0200] contended that a socially responsible image can differentiate a brand and enhance customer loyalty, especially for consumer-focused firms. [@bib0050] suggested that *CCG* may induce customers to increase their demand for the firm\'s products or services, or their willingness to pay premium prices. Therefore, firms with high *CCG* differentiated themselves from those with lower *CCG* to the target consumer and reaped the benefits of consumer loyalty ([@bib0055]). Examining the effect of corporate giving growth on sales growth using a large sample of publicly traded U.S. companies from 1989 through 2000, [@bib0200] identified a positive link between *CCG* and customer satisfaction and found that *CCG* is significantly and positively related to future sales revenue.

Moreover, to reduce the risks of negative events, firm may have incentives to convey a socially responsible image through *CCG* ([@bib0065], [@bib0140], [@bib0265]). [@bib0265] indicated that as *CCG* promoted a firm as socially responsible, the firm\'s key stakeholders were more likely to cooperate with the firm by providing critical resources when it faced a negative event. [@bib0065] noted that a positive company image built by *CCG* induced friendlier treatment by regulators and policymakers, especially when firms were facing litigation risks or entry regulation. [@bib0140] asserted that *CCG* benefited shareholders by generating positive moral capital among stakeholders and communities. The moral capital can then provide shareholders with protection for a firm\'s relationship-based intangible assets. This protection contributed to shareholder wealth, implying a positively financial consequence of *CCG*.

At the same time, *CCG* could have a negative influence on corporate performance. Obviously, *CCG* incurs a business expenses (a direct cost). [@bib0065] indicated that *CCG* can generate additional agency costs, when managerial insiders pursue their own interest through discretionary giving, but at the expense of the shareholders. Specifically, managerial insiders can use corporate contributions to influence target stakeholders and to promote their own interests ([@bib0035], [@bib0155], [@bib0265]). These arguments suggest that instead of benefiting a firm or its shareholders, *CCG* may enhance only top managers' personal interests. Accordingly, *CCG* has a negative impact on corporate performance.

In addition to both positive and negative effects, empirical research studies have found an insignificant impact of *CCG* on corporate performance ([@bib0045], [@bib0150], [@bib0245]). [@bib0150] found that *CCG* could not significantly explain the measures of corporate profitability, return on asset and return on equity. [@bib0045] showed that the influence of *CCG* on return on asset was not statistically significant. [@bib0245] illustrated that monetary donations did not affect firms' stock return, suggesting that *CCG* had no significant effects on corporate stock performance.

One possible explanation for this insignificant link between *CCG* and corporate performance is the interaction between benefit and cost resulting from *CCG*. While the increased *CCG* may enhance operational efficiency and improve corporate profit, it may also incur direct cost and additional agency cost and exacerbate corporate performance at the same time. Thus, benefit and cost may offset each other, resulting in no significant effect. In addition, [@bib0135] and [@bib0215] suggested that a firm may give to charity because of industry or community pressure, not because of the apparent financial implications.

Furthermore, using a panel data set of 817 firms listed in the *Taft Corporate Giving Directory* from 1987 to 1999, [@bib0265] empirically investigated the effect of *CCG* on corporate financial performance measured by *ROA* and *Tobin*\'s *q*. They regressed financial performance measures on both the linear and squared terms of *CCG*. Regression test results revealed that the coefficient of the linear term was significantly positive, and the coefficient of the squared term was significantly negative. The findings indicated an inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between *CCG* and corporate performance. The inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship suggested that corporate performance initially increased with *CCG*, but then decreased after *CCG* exceeded its optimal level.

To summarize, the answer to the question about whether or not *CCG* affects corporate performance remains inconclusive. Indeed the financial consequence of *CCG* could vary across countries and industry sectors. While previous studies of the financial consequence of *CCG* were centered on U.K. and U.S.A., no empirical studies have investigated it within the context of emerging countries and the hospitality industry. Although *CCG* contributions, a specific component of corporate social responsibility (*CSR*), are of growing importance to companies, the studies of *CCG* remain relatively underdeveloped ([@bib0055], [@bib0205]). Furthermore, as [@bib0190] pointed out, despite the growing importance of *CSR* to numerous industries including the hospitality industry, the financial consequences of *CSR* activities have rarely been examined within the context of hospitality.

Several hospitality studies have examined the *CSR* issue ([@bib0180], [@bib0190], [@bib0230]). [@bib0230] analyzed the influence of social and environmental responsibility on firm performance in Spain\'s hotel sector. They found a strong and positive firm financial impact of social and environmental responsibility. [@bib0180] attempted to ascertain whether lodging and gaming companies with high *CSR* ranking outperformed their counterparts that were not highly ranked. Similarly, their findings suggested that lodging and gaming firms with well-executed *CSR* initiatives have higher profit margins and higher return on equity than the rest of the sampled firms. [@bib0190] examined the effects of positive and negative *CSR* activities on the financial performance of airline, casino, hotel and restaurant companies and arrived at mixed results. Although not specifically addressing *CCG*, these hospitality studies suggest that corporate social performance often, but not always, has a positive effect on corporate performance.

As the first research study to extend the examination of the relationship between *CCG* and firm financial performance to the hospitality industry in Taiwan, this study contributes to the understanding of the impact of *CCG* on corporate performance in different countries and industry segments. Empirical test results can shed light on the effects of *CCG* on corporate performance of publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan and offer valuable managerial insights for the hospitality industry.

3. Data and variables {#sec0015}
=====================

3.1. Corporate charitable giving {#sec0020}
--------------------------------

This study uses a sample of 13 publicly traded hospitality companies based on the classification of the Taiwan Stock Exchange: Ambassador Hotel, China Airlines, Eva Airways, First Hotel, Grant Formosa Regent Taipei, Hotel Holiday Garden, Hotel Royal Chihpen, Janfusun Fancy World, Landis Taipei Hotel, Leofoo Hotel, New Palace International Company Ltd., Phoenix Tours International Inc. and Wanhwa Enterprise Company Ltd. The sample hospitality companies provided required *CCG* and corporate performance data from 1996 to 2011 (16 years). The total value of corporate giving (*CG*) at the end of each year is retrieved from the annual statistics of Market Observation Post System (<http://newmopsov.twse.com.tw/>). [Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"} shows the distribution of the yearly corporate giving. Accounting and financial data at the end of each year for measuring corporate performance are collected from the database of the Taiwan Economic Journal. Consequently, 208 yearly sample observations (13 hospitality companies multiplied by 16 years) are available for the panel regression analysis.Table 1The distribution of the yearly corporate giving.YearCG = 00 \< CG ≤ 0.1 M0.1 M \< CG ≤ 0.5 M0.5 M \< CG ≤ 1 M1 M \< CG ≤ 5 M5 M \< CG ≤ 10 M10 M \< CG ≤ 20 MCG≥20 MTotal CG19963521110012.35 M19973421200154.51 M1998352120004.87 M19992512210013.95 M2000362110001.63 M2001451120003.94 M2002442210002.77 M2003561100000.86 M20044511101012.30 M2005262120002.87 M2006362110003.26 M20073521100158.86 M20083531000156.84 M2009261211006.62 M20104521001011.43 M20112412121011.62 MTotal5082272018533258.68 M(24.0%)(39.4%)(13.0%)(9.6%)(8.7%)(2.4%)(1.4%)(1.4%)[^2]

Following [@bib0055], [@bib0200] and [@bib0265], this study uses the ratio of *CG* to sales revenue as the explanatory variable (*CCG*), which is defined as:$$CCG = \frac{\text{CG}}{\text{Sales\ revenue}} \times 100\%\text{.}$$

3.2. Corporate performance measures {#sec0025}
-----------------------------------

Two commonly used performance measures of profitability and quality of earnings are returns on assets (*ROA*) and returns on equity (*ROE*) ([@bib0060], [@bib0235]). The variables of *ROA* and *ROE* measure profit per dollar of assets and per dollar of equity, respectively:$$ROA = \frac{\text{Net\ Income}}{\text{Total\ Assets}} \times 100\%\text{,}$$and$$ROE = \frac{\text{Net}\,\text{Income}}{\text{Total}\,\text{Equity}} \times 100\%\text{,}$$

[@bib0015] and [@bib0185] noted that return on total assets represents the management efficiency of a firm\'s assets to create profits. Return on total equity is appropriate to compare quality of earnings across different firms in the same industry ([@bib0070], [@bib0075]).

Note that *ROA* and *ROE* (accounting measures) signal a firm\'s past profitability performance. In addition to the profitability measures, this study uses stock return (*SR*) and Tobin\'s Q (*TQ*) to reflect a firm\'s future prospects and intangible value. Stock return is computed as:$$SR_{t} = \ln\frac{SP_{t}}{SP_{t - 1}} \times 100\%\text{,}$$where *SP* is the closing stock price and the subscript, *t*, represents time period. A company\'s stock price is considered to be the most important financial performance measure ([@bib0170]). Stock price signals the market\'s expectations of a firm\'s performance including future growth opportunity. Accordingly, a higher *SR* indicates a higher future prospect.

*TQ* is a generally used measurement of a firm\'s intangible value ([@bib0110], [@bib0195], [@bib0210]) and is defined as the ratio of market value of a firm to the replacement costs of its assets (*RCA*):$$TQ = \frac{\text{Market\ value}}{\text{RCA}} \times 100\%\text{,}$$

The study follows [@bib0110] to use the book value of total assets to proxy for the replacement costs of its assets and market value of a firm is computed as the sum of the market value of common stock, the book value of preferred stock and debt. Using this way to compute *TQ* ratio is simple because it needs variables that are generally available in the common database. A higher *TQ* signals a higher intangible asset value or a greater opportunity for future growth.

3.3. Control variables {#sec0030}
----------------------

The control variables included in the study are firm size (*SIZE*) and growth rate of sales (*GSALE*). Firm size has been used in several research studies on the financial consequences of *CCG* ([@bib0200], [@bib0245], [@bib0265]). The variable of *SIZE* is computed as the natural logarithm of the total assets:$$SIZE = \ln(\text{Total\ assets})\text{,}$$

[@bib0040] and [@bib0160] indicated that large firms can achieve operating cost efficiencies and be more profitable through economies of scale. [@bib0085] noted that large firms are likely to have market power and better performance in a competitive environment with a greater capability to adapt to changes in a market condition. Thus, large firms are likely to perform better. In addition, firm size plays an important role in explaining stock return ([@bib0125]).

Following [@bib0010] and [@bib0095], this study uses the growth rate of sales (*GSALE*) as a control variable to signal growth opportunities:$$GSALE_{t} = \ln\frac{SALE_{t}}{SALE_{t - 1}} \times 100\%\text{,}$$where *SALE* ~*t*~ is the annual total sales revenue at the end of year *t*. [@bib0010] used the sales growth as a control variable in examining the financial consequences of equity ownership. [@bib0095] found that *GSALE* consistently shows a significant explanatory power on accounting performance measures (*ROA* and *ROE*), but not on *SR* and *TQ*.

[Table 2](#tbl0010){ref-type="table"} summarizes the descriptive statistics of study variables. *CCG* ranged from 0.00% to 2.176% with a mean of 0.052% and a standard deviation of 0.239% from 1996 to 2011. In other words, the Taiwanese hospitality companies spent about 0.052% of their sales revenue on charitable donations. It is worth noting that although sample data are based on different types of companies and periods, the sample mean of *CCG* in this study is higher than 0.035% for the UK case ([@bib0055]) and less than 0.097% for the case of the USA ([@bib0200]).Table 2Summary statistics of study variables (panel data).*NCCGROAROESRTQGSALESIZE*Mean2080.0523.7294.4788.832125.1629.77215.477Median2080.0003.3904.1903.71295.2553.18015.423Maximum2082.17620.14032.990199.874817.388956.80019.317Minimum2080.000−13.000−28.900−78.81216.162−31.39012.634Std. Dev.2080.2395.6929.01039.621121.10672.0271.705[^3]

Ranging from −13.000% to 20.140%, *ROA* has a mean of 3.729% and a standard deviation of 5.692%. The *ROE* fluctuates from −28.900% to 32.990% with a mean of 4.478% and a standard deviation of 9.010%. *SR* ranges from −78.812% to 199.874%, with a mean of 8.832% and a standard deviation of 39.621%. Fluctuating from 16.162% to 817.388%, the mean *TQ* is 125.162% with a standard deviation of 121.106%. The high volatility of *TQ* may indicate that the level of market participants' valuation on firms' future prospects swings from time to time. For the control variables, *GSALE* and *SIZE* are also volatile. Ranging from -31.390% to 956.800%, the *GSALE* has a mean of 9.772% and a standard deviation of 72.027%. Firm size ranges from 12.634 (NT\$ 258 million) to 19.317 (NT\$ 245 billion) with a mean of 15.477 (NT\$ 26.543 billion) and a standard deviation of 1.705 (NT\$ 4.425 billion).

4. Methodology and empirical results {#sec0035}
====================================

4.1. Panel regression tests {#sec0040}
---------------------------

To examine the impact of *CCG* on corporate performance, this study employs panel regression analysis based on panel data of the 13 sampled publicly traded Taiwanese hospitality companies from 1996 to 2011. A panel data set has the advantage of both cross-sectional and time series and thus captures the differences among subjects from cross-sectional information and the changes within subjects over time from the time-series. Therefore, panel regression analysis can control for an individual firm\'s heterogeneity, reduce multicollinearity, improve estimation bias, and specify the time-varying correlation between dependent and independent variables ([@bib0025], [@bib0175]).

The following panel regression test equations, including both the linear and quadratic terms of *CCG*, are performed to examine the potential curvilinear relationship between *CCG* and corporate performance:$$\text{Model\ I}:\text{ \,\,}ROA = a_{10} + b_{11}CCG + b_{12}CCG^{2} + b_{13}GSALE + b_{14}SIZE + \varepsilon_{1}\text{,}$$ $$\text{Model\ II}:\text{ \,\,}ROE = a_{20} + b_{21}CCG + b_{22}CCG^{2} + b_{23}GSALE + b_{24}SIZE + \varepsilon_{2}\text{,}$$ $$\text{Model\ III}:\text{ \,\,}SR = a_{30} + b_{31}CCG + b_{32}CCG^{2} + b_{33}GSALE + b_{34}SIZE + \varepsilon_{3}\text{,}$$ $$\text{Model\ IV}:\text{ \,\,}TQ = a_{40} + b_{41}CCG + b_{42}CCG^{2} + b_{43}GSALE + b_{44}SIZE + \varepsilon_{4}\text{.}$$

Based on these panel regression test equations, the curvilinear relationship between *CGR* and *CP* (in term of *ROA*, *ROE*, *SR* or *TQ*) exists if *b* ~*i*2~ (*i*  = 1...4) is significantly different from zero. Particularly, if both *b* ~*i*1~ and *b* ~*i*2~ (*i*  = 1...4) are significantly different from zero, there may be a U-shaped or an inverted U-shaped effect of *CGR* on *CP*. For instance, if *b* ~*i*1~ and *b* ~*i*2~ are rejected, and specifically the coefficient of *CGR* on *ROA* is significantly positive (negative) and the coefficient of *CGR* ^*2*^ on *ROA* is significantly negative (positive), it hence indicates that there is an inverted U-shaped (a U-shaped) relationship between *CGR* and *ROA*. However, if *b* ~11~ (*i*  = 1...4) are significantly different from zero (*b* ~*i*1~  = 0 is rejected) and *b* ~*i*2~ is not significantly different from zero (*b* ~*i*2~  = 0 is not rejected), suggesting that the relationship between *CGR* and corporate performance (*ROA*, *ROE*, *SR* or *TQ*) is linear, not curvilinear. For example, if *b* ~21~  ≠ 0 and *b* ~22~  ≠ 0, it implies that the significant influence of *CGR* on *ROE* is linear, but there is no curvilinear relationship between the two factors.

4.2. Estimation of panel regression tests {#sec0045}
-----------------------------------------

[@bib0115] indicated that three methods can be used to estimate panel regression tests: pooled OLS, the fixed effects and the random effects. The pooled OLS method estimates the common constant for all cross-sections, assuming no differences between the estimated cross-sections. The constant is treated as section-specific in the fixed effects method. The difference between the fixed effects and random effects methods is that the constants of the random effects method for each section are random parameters.

The *F*-test is used to determine whether the pooled OLS is more appropriate than the fixed effect method. The null hypothesis is that all the constants are the same and the common constant (pooled OLS) method is applicable. The *F*-statistic is$F = \frac{(r_{FE}^{2} - r_{CC}^{2})/(n - 1)}{(1 - r_{FE}^{2})/(nt - n - k)} \sim F(n - 1,nt - n - k)\text{,}$

where $r_{FE}^{2}$ is the coefficient of determination of the fixed effects method, $r_{CC}^{2}$ is the coefficient of determination of the pooled OLS method, *n* is the number of hospitality firms, and *t* and *k* represent the time periods and the number of the independent variables, respectively. In this study, *n* is equal to 13, *t* is 16 and *k* is 4, showing that there are 208 sample observations (13 firms multiplied by 16 quarters) available for the panel regression test.

The null hypothesis can be rejected if *F*-statistic is larger than *F*-test critical value, implying that the fixed effects method is more appropriate than the pooled OLS method. Otherwise, the pooled OLS method is more appropriate than the fixed effects. Further, if the fixed effects method is more appropriate than the pooled OLS method, the [@bib0165] test should be used to determine whether the fixed or random effects method should be used when performing panel regressions based on Eqs. [(8)](#eq0040){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(9)](#eq0045){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(10)](#eq0050){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(11)](#eq0055){ref-type="disp-formula"}.

5. Empirical test results {#sec0050}
=========================

[Table 3](#tbl0015){ref-type="table"} summarizes *F*-test and Hausman test results. The *F*-test results in panel A of [Table 3](#tbl0015){ref-type="table"} show that panel regressions based on models I, II and IV are all significant at the 1% level (the rejection of the null hypothesis), but are not statistically significant for model III. The results suggest that the fixed effects method is most appropriate for models I, II and IV, and the pooled OLS is most suitable for model III. Thus, it is necessary to perform the [@bib0165] test to check whether the fixed or random effects method should be used to estimate regression models I, II and IV. The Hausman test results in panel B reveal that panel regressions based on the models I and II are statistically significant at the 10% level, but not for model IV, implying that the fixed effects method is appropriate for models I and II, and the random effects method is appropriate for model IV.Table 3*F*-test and Hausman test results.Panel A: The null hypothesis: The pooled OLS is more appropriate than the fixed effects model*F*-statistic \[*p*-value\]Test results*ROA* (Model I)15.12 \[0.00\][\*\*\*](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}Fixed effects*ROE* (Model II)11.32 \[0.00\][\*\*\*](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}Fixed effects*SR* (Model III)0.68 \[0.77\]Pooled OLS*TQ* (Model IV)7.91 \[0.00\][\*\*\*](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}Fixed effectsPanel B: The null hypothesis: The random effects model is more appropriate than the fixed effects modelHausman test \[*p*-value\]Test results*ROA* (Model I)6.24 \[0.09\][\*](#tblfn0005){ref-type="table-fn"}Fixed effects*ROE* (Model II)7.07 \[0.07\][\*](#tblfn0005){ref-type="table-fn"}Fixed effects*TQ* (Model IV)3.18 \[0.37\]Random effects[^4][^5][^6]

Panel regression test results of the impact of *CCG* on *ROA*, *ROE*, *TQ* and *SR* are summarized in [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}, [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}, [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"} .[2](#fn0005){ref-type="fn"} Each table also presents test results with only the main explanatory variables, *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^, excluding the control variables. [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"} summarizes the panel regression test results of the effects of *CCG* on profitability measured by *ROA* and *ROE*. As shown in panel A, the corresponding coefficients of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROA* are 14.645 and -7.041, both of which are statistically significant at the 1% level. The significance of coefficients of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ remains when control variables *GSALE* and *SIZE* are included in the regression test. The positive coefficient of *CCG* and the negative coefficient of *CCG* ^2^ suggest that the relationship between *CCG* and *ROA* is curvilinear (i.e. an inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *ROA*). The explanatory power of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROA*, represented by adjusted *R* ^*2*^ value, is 22.3% (see panel A).Table 4Panel regression test results of *CCG* and *CCG*^2^ on *ROA* and *ROE*.Panel A: *ROA* (Fixed effects)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*3.7469.0820.000[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*14.6452.5850.010[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*^2^−7.041−2.4810.014[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*F*-statistic = 5.993Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.223Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.000Panel B: *ROA* (Fixed effects)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*14.2524.1400.000[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*13.7652.5000.013[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*^2^−6.504−2.3570.019[\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}*GSALE*0.0111.9680.050[\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}*SIZE*−0.689−3.1140.002[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*F*-statistic = 6.204Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.237Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.000Panel C: *ROE* (Fixed effects)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*4.5206.9460.000[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*22.9562.5680.011[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*^2^−11.102−2.4800.014[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*F*-statistic = 4.076Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.156Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.000Panel D: *ROE* (Fixed effects)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*30.7854.5470.000[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*22.6372.0910.038[\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*^2^−10.476−1.9310.055[\*](#tblfn0015){ref-type="table-fn"}*GSALE*0.0222.0560.041[\*\*](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}*SIZE*−1.734−3.9840.000[\*\*\*](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}*F*-statistic = 5.560Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.175Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.000[^7][^8][^9][^10]Table 5Panel regression test results of *CCG* and *CCG*^2^ on *SR*.Panel A: *SR*\
(Pooled OLS)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*9.8823.1740.002[\*\*\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*−36.929−0.9050.367*CCG*^2^14.6530.7180.474*F*-statistic = 0.524Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.006Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.593Panel B: *SR*\
(Pooled OLS)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*32.1621.2010.232*CCG*−38.221−0.9510.343*CCG*^2^15.6020.7760.439*GSALE*0.1112.7680.006[\*\*\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}*SIZE*−1.508−0.8810.380*F*-statistic = 2.487Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.053Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.045[^11][^12]Table 6Panel regression test results of *CCG* and *CCG*^2^ on *TQ*.Panel A: *TQ*\
(Random effects)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*114.56114.7610.000[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*281.1172.4020.017[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*^2^−122.541−2.1760.031[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}*F*-statistic = 8.017Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.395Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.000Panel B: *TQ*\
(Random effects)Coefficient*t*-statistics*p*-value*Constant*1237.0892.7700.006[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*261.5222.2570.025[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}*CCG*^2^−112.014−2.0080.046[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}*GSALE*−0.058−0.5500.583*SIZE*−72.508−2.5140.013[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}*F*-statistic = 7.593Adjusted *R*^2^ = 0.415Prob. (*F*-statistic) = 0.000[^13][^14][^15]

Panel C of [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"} reports that the corresponding coefficients of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROE* are 22.956 and −11.102, both are statistically significant at the 1% level. Test results also indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *ROE*. The significant influence of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROE* remains when test equation includes the control variables of *GSALE* and *SIZE* (see panel D). The explanatory power of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROE* is 15.6%, showing that *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ can explain a higher percentage of variation in *ROA* than in *ROE*.

However, neither *CCG* nor *CCG* ^2^ have a significant impact on *SR*. The coefficient of *CCG*, as shown in panel A of [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}, is negative, indicating that *CCG* lowers the stock return, but the negative influence is not statistically significant. The square term of *CCG* has a positive but insignificant effect on *SR*. The explanatory power of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *SR* is as low as 0.58%. Similar results are found after the control variables are included in the test equation shown in panel B.

Test results of the impact of *CCG* on *TQ* are shown in [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"}. The coefficients of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ are 281.117 and −122.541 and both are significant at the 5% level (see panel A). The results also suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *TQ*. The significant impact of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *TQ* remains when test equation includes the control variables of *GSALE* and *SIZE* (see panel B). The explanatory power of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *TQ* is high at 39.5%.

Test results in [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}, [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}, [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"} reveal that the control variable *GSALE* has a significantly positive effect on *ROA* and *ROE* at the 5% level (see [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}) and on *SR* at the 1% level (see [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}). However, the effect of *GSALE* on *TQ* is not statistically significant (see [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"}). Firm size is significantly and negatively related to *ROA*, *ROE* ([Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}) and *TQ* ([Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"}) at the 1% level. However, the relationship between *SIZE* and *SR* is not statistically significant ([Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}).

To provide a robustness check for whether test results of the impact of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on hospitality firm performance (in terms of ROA, ROE, SR and TQ) reported in [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}, [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}, [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"} could be largely driven by a few observations with a relatively high value of *CG* and hence a high value of *CCG*, the study removes three influential observations (as shown in [Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"}) and performs all panel regression tests again. [Table 7](#tbl0035){ref-type="table"} presents panel regression test results of a robustness check. Indeed, the test results of the effects of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on hospitality firm performance in panel A of [Table 7](#tbl0035){ref-type="table"} are not significantly different from those reported in [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}, [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}, [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"}. Moreover, we remove the most influential hospitality firm (Ambassador Hotel) from the sample and re-run all analyses. Similarly, test results in panel B of [Table 7](#tbl0035){ref-type="table"} indicate that the coefficients of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ* are still significant, suggesting that the inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and corporate performance (*ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ*) remains.Table 7Panel regression test results of a robustness check.*ConstantCCGCCG*^2^*GSALESIZE*Adjusted *R*^2^*Panel AROA*6.431\
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6. Discussion and conclusion {#sec0055}
============================

The publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan were found to be willing to engage in *CCG*. Do Taiwanese hospitality companies expect to "do well by doing good"? Are they doing good mainly for the sake of doing good? As mentioned, while *CCG* may have a positive or negative effect on corporate performance, it is also possible that *CCG* has no impact at all. In order to answer the questions, this study examines whether *CCG* affected the corporate performance of publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan from 1996 to 2011.

Empirical test results reveal that the publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan could do well by doing good during the sample period. Specifically, the study finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and corporate performance measured by *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ*. These results are similar to those found in [@bib0265]. The curvilinear relationship between *CCG* and corporate performance (*ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ*) may be determined by the interactions between benefit and cost generated by *CCG* in Taiwan\'s hospitality industry. Owners and managerial insiders of publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan may incorporate the findings in this study into their management and strategy of *CCG*.

As *CCG* increases, *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ* could improve, implying that the benefits yielded by *CCG* could exceed the costs incurred (direct giving expenses and/or agency cost). As mentioned, the higher level of *CCG* may create a positive public image for the hospitality firms, facilitating brand differentiation, stakeholder cooperation and risk reduction. These benefits of *CCG* enhance operational efficiency, profitability and the value of intangible asset. Nonetheless, as *CCG* continues to increase beyond the optimal point, the direct giving expenses and/or agency cost exceed the benefits, and hence corporate performance measured by *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ* deteriorates.

In addition, the inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and corporate performance (*ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ*) suggests the existence of an optimal point of *CCG*. Based on the estimated coefficients of the panel regression test results, the corresponding optimal point of *CCG* on *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ* can be calculated as follows. As shown in panels A and C of [Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"}, the regression test results of both *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROA* and *ROE* are given as:$$ROA = 3.746 + 14.645 \times CCG - 7.041 \times CCG^{2},ROE = 4.520 + 22.956 \times CCG - 11.102 \times CCG^{2}\text{.}$$

To compute the corresponding optimal *CCG* level maximizing *ROA* and *ROE*, the study takes the derivative of *ROA* and *ROE* with respect to *CCG*. The equations then become:$$0 = 14.645 - 2 \times 7.041 \times CCG,0 = 22.956 - 2 \times 11.102 \times CCG\text{.}$$

Accordingly, the optimal *CCG* level maximizing *ROA* is 1.040% and the optimal *CCG* level maximizing *ROE* is 1.034%. [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"} plots the inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *ROA*. The inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *ROE* is shown in [Fig. 2](#fig0010){ref-type="fig"} . Similarly, applying the same procedure to *TQ* reveals that the optimal point of *CCG* maximizing *TQ* is 1.147%. The inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *TQ* is plotted in [Fig. 3](#fig0015){ref-type="fig"} .Fig. 2The inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *ROA*.Fig. 3The inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *ROE*.

According to these results, the corresponding optimal *CCG* level that maximizes *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ* is significantly higher than the sample mean *CCG* for the listed Taiwanese hospitality companies from 1996 to 2011 (0.052% in [Table 2](#tbl0010){ref-type="table"}). Particularly, the size of *CCG* that maximizes *ROA* and *ROE* is about 20 times (1.04/0.052) that of the study sample mean. The size of *CCG* that maximizes *TQ* is even about 22 (1.147/0.052) times that of the sample mean. This finding has two important policy implications ([Fig. 4](#fig0020){ref-type="fig"} ).Fig. 4The inverted U-shaped relationship between *CCG* and *TQ*.

First, based on the sample period -- 1996 to 2011 -- while the publicly traded hospitality companies could do well by doing good, they seemed to donate too little to *CCG*. Therefore, owners and managerial insiders of the Taiwanese hospitality companies should continue designating a higher proportion of sales revenue for charitable giving. By so doing, the benefits generated from *CCG* would exceed the cost incurred by *CCG*. As *CCG* increases, it can enhance the corporate performance (in terms of *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ*) of the publicly traded hospitality companies.

Second, it is noteworthy that although Taiwanese hospitality companies should have made more donations, this did not imply an unlimited increase in *CCG*. Specifically, the impact of *CCG* on *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ* is an inverted U-shape, implying that *CCG* has a beneficial effect on corporate performance, but only up to a point, beyond which corporate performance will deteriorate. The publicly traded hospitality companies are advised to increase *CCG* to a level that is close to the optimal level, thereby maximizing corporate performance.

It is further found that *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ can explain a higher percentage of variation in *TQ* than in *ROA* and *ROE*. The size of the explanatory power of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *TQ* is about 1.8 times that of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROA* and is more than twice that of *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ on *ROE*. The finding suggests that *CCG* and *CCG* ^2^ have a major influence on intangible asset value (or future growth opportunity) instead of current profitability performance of the Taiwanese hospitality companies. [@bib0250] argued that *CCG* should be considered a component of long-term competitiveness, not a short-term image builder and sales generator. Thus, *CCG* could be viewed as a form of investment in intangible assets with predictably positive effects on corporate performance of hospitality companies. Therefore, hospitality firms would be well advised to develop a multi-period giving strategy.

The study also finds that *CCG* had no significant impact on stock return of hospitality companies. One possible explanation is that stock market participants or hospitality stock investors may not consider the act of corporate giving to be an effective strategy to improve corporate performance for hospitality companies. For the two control variables, *GSALE* has an expected significant impact on corporate performance measures in terms of *ROA*, *ROE* and stock return. However, firm size is found to have a significantly negative influence on *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ* in this study, which is different from the result in [@bib0265] that *SIZE* has a significantly positive influence on *ROA* and *TQ*. This implies that larger hospitality firms in Taiwan are likely to have poor profitability performance and lower intangible asset value (or future growth opportunity). The finding contradicts the arguments by [@bib0040] and [@bib0160] that larger firms should have a better performance. Why large hospitality firms in Taiwan have poor corporate performance in terms of *ROA*, *ROE* and *TQ*, and whether poor corporate performance affects *CCG* decisions of large Taiwanese hospitality firms are questions that merit further investigation.

While *CCG* is found to have a significant impact on corporate performance of publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan, it does not imply the same results can be applied to the hospitality industry in different countries. It is highly possible that the effects of *CCG* on corporate performance will vary among countries. To provide a comparative examination and arrive at a more general conclusion, future researchers can perform similar investigations using *CCG* data of the hospitality industry from other countries to compare the significant influences of *CCG* on hospitality firm performance in other countries to those found in this study.

Furthermore, the levels of *CCG* could vary widely among hospitality sectors, such as airline, gambling, restaurant and travel or tourism firms, and the impact of *CCG* on corporate performance of various hospitality sectors is also likely to be different. Given the relatively small number of publicly traded hospitality firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, this study was unable to examine if the impact of *CCG* on corporate performance varies among different hospitality segments. It would be interesting for future researchers to test variations in the effects of *CCG* on financial performance of firms in different sectors of the hospitality industry.

Finally, this study finds that *CCG* has a beneficial effect on corporate performance of publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan. In other words, publicly traded hospitality companies in Taiwan could do well by doing good. Another interesting question is whether hospitality companies with better corporate performance (doing well) are more willing to contribute to *CCG* (doing good). [@bib0225] and [@bib0260] noted that corporate social behavior was positively related to profitability given that firms with higher profitability because of their excellent management may have more discretionary profit to invest in socially responsible activities. Accordingly, profitable firms are likely to have discretionary funds to contribute to *CCG*. Future studies can examine whether hospitality companies contribute to *CCG* because they are doing well.

This research was conducted and completed when Ming-Hsiang Chen spent his sabbatical leave at School of Hospitality Business Management, Washington State University. Ming-Hsiang Chen is grateful to Washington State University for hosting him during his sabbatical leave. Financial support for this research project was provided by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan (Grant No.: MOST 103-2410-H-194-104-).

The estimation results based on two-way (cross-section and period) fixed effects (not reported here) are not significantly different from those based on one-way (cross-section) fixed effects, and available upon request.

[^1]: Tel.: +886 52720411; fax: +886 52720818.

[^2]: *Notes*: The size of sample firms for each year is 13 and the total sample size is 208. *CG* denotes the total value of corporate charitable giving. M denotes million NT\$ (New Taiwan dollar). Numbers in parenthesis are shares in the total sample.

[^3]: *Notes*: *N* = sample size. *CCG* = (total corporate giving value)/(sale revenues) × 100. *ROA* (return on assets) = (net income)/(total assets). *ROE* (return on equity) = (net income)/(total equity). *SR* = stock return. *TQ* (Tobin\'s Q) = (market value of a firm)/(the replacement costs of assets). *GSALE* = the growth rate of sales and *SIZE* = the natural logarithm of the total assets.

[^4]: *Notes*: *CCG* = (total corporate giving value)/(sale revenues) × 100. *ROA* (return on assets) = (net income)/(total assets). *ROE* (return on equity) = (net income)/(total equity). *SR* = stock return. *TQ* (Tobin\'s Q) = (market value of a firm)/(the replacement costs of assets).

[^5]: Significant at the 10% level.

[^6]: Significant at the 1% level.

[^7]: *Notes*: *CCG* = (total corporate giving value)/(sale revenues) × 100. *ROA* (return on assets) = (net income)/(total assets). *ROE* (return on equity) = (net income)/(total equity). *GSALE* = the growth rate of sales and *SIZE* = the natural logarithm of the total assets.

[^8]: Significant at the 10% level.

[^9]: Significant at the 5% level.

[^10]: Significant at the 1% level.

[^11]: *Notes*: *CCG* = (total corporate giving value)/(sale revenues) × 100. *SR* = stock return. *GSALE* = the growth rate of sales and *SIZE* = the natural logarithm of the total assets.

[^12]: Significant at the 1% level.

[^13]: *Notes*: *CCG* = (total corporate giving value)/(sale revenues) × 100. *TQ* (Tobin\'s Q) = (market value of a firm)/(the replacement costs of assets). *GSALE* = the growth rate of sales and *SIZE* = the natural logarithm of the total assets.

[^14]: Significant at the 5% level.

[^15]: Significant at the 1% level.

[^16]: *Notes*: *CCG* = (total corporate giving value)/(sale revenues) × 100. *ROA* (return on assets) = (net income)/(total assets). *ROE* (return on equity) = (net income)/(total equity). *GSALE* = the growth rate of sales and *SIZE* = the natural logarithm of the total assets.

[^17]: Figures in parentheses are *p*-values.

[^18]: Significant at the 10% level.

[^19]: Significant at the 5% level.

[^20]: Significant at the 1% level.
